ProLaw has an exciting new development for iPad users. ProLaw is an integrated software suite designed to automate the practice and manage the business of law. Pro has features that simplify, streamline and coordinate the work of attorneys and staff…

Continue reading this article, and get more legal technology news and information, at FindLaw.com.

Technologist Jason Beahm

I love it when tech giants battle over stuff, particularly in the legal arena.  When you have two parties with virtually unlimited resources and an unfettered willingness to spend money on lawyers, it makes for interesting reading … and hopefully for more interesting law at some point down the line.  We don’t always have such excitement in the Boston legal community.

Such is the case with Microsoft’s recent filing at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) (of the United States Patent and Trademark Office) contesting Apple’s attempt to trademark the term “APP STORE.”  Microsoft argues that “APP STORE”  is “generic for retail store services featuring apps and unregistrable for ancillary services such as searching for and downloading apps from such stores.”  The company further contends that “APP”  is “a common term for mobile software applications, while “STORE” is a common term for a “place where goods are sold.” 

Following so far?  A generic term can’t be registered for use as a trademark because it refers to the actual product class of which a particular product is a member and therefore can’t be protected as a mark.  It would be like trying to register the term “VIDEO GAME” for video games or—for those of us over 40 who still remember video games’ predecessors—the term “PINBALL” to describe pinball machines.

Microsoft’s argument has merit and the company has a reasonable basis to contest the mark.  Of course, this doesn’t mean that Apple won’t win in the end, but it should be an interesting read when the TTAB decision come out—at least to us trademark lawyers.  (And the parties may then have the opportunity to fight it out in federal court.)  Needless to say, neither party suffers from a lack of resources to fight to the bitter end.  But they could settle too, if for instance, Apple lets Microsoft use the term to describe its own “App Store.”

There are numerous factors which the TTAB and a court can take into consideration when determining whether a mark is generic, including:  how the potential trademark owner itself uses the term; whether third parties use the term as a common name for their own products; what the dictionary definition is (if any) for the term as a common name for a particular type of product; whether there are other available terms to describe the common name for the products; the period of time in which the trademark has been in use; how the press and others use the term; and of course, the results of any survey evidence that either party introduces (which are usually subject to vigorous attack by the other party).  There are other factors too, but these tend to be the main ones for determining “genericness.” 

Without going into too much detail here, Microsoft does have some favorable evidence to support its claim, as does Apple.  While there are a ton of trademark cases that discuss generic marks, a 4th Circuit decision comes to mind, Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry Seafood Restaurant, Inc., 240 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2001).  In that case, the court found that the term, “CRAB HOUSE” to describe a restaurant that, uh, served crabs “is a generic term referring to a class of restaurants that serve crabs.”  It found:

Here, the meaning of the individual words is fairly clear. A crab is “any of numerous chiefly marine broadly built crustaceans,” while “restaurant” is one of the many definitions of the word “house.”  Webster’s New International Dictionary 1096 (3d ed. 1961). Other common words that are often used as synonyms for “restaurant” include bar, parlor, and shop. When preceded by a type of food, these words describe various classes of restaurants, such as ale houses, tapas bars, ice cream parlors, and coffee shops. Each term denotes a class of restaurant serving a particular type of food, just as”crab house” denotes a class of restaurant that serves crabs. 

The court also rejected the plaintiff’s survey evidence when assessing genericness.  So “CRAB HOUSE” was deemed to be unprotectable.  While there are a few factors that differentiate this case and some of its principles from what Microsoft is arguing at the TTAB (such as time frame related to evaluating genericness), given the abundance of legal precedent in this area, the company can reasonably argue that ”APP STORE” is a generic term (or a merely descriptive one) for a place that sells applications.  Much of the fight will be over the term “APP.”

Of course, as any intellectual property or technology lawyer will tell you, trademark law is a highly nunaced area of practice, so these cases can turn on distinctions that at times seem more imaginary than real—especially in a sector as fast-paced as technology.  We’ll just have to wait and see.

We’ve featured a lot of the ways that iPhones can help you run your law practice, but one that isn’t recommended is for robbing restaurants. For whatever reason, Jerome Taylor thought that he could rob a Connecticut restaurant with just…

Continue reading this article, and get more legal technology news and information, at FindLaw.com.

Technologist Jason Beahm

FindLaw columnist Eric Sinrod writes regularly in this section on legal developments surrounding technology and the internet. Right before the start of the last decade, the chief tech concern was Y2K and the worry that computers worldwide would crash as…

Continue reading this article, and get more legal technology news and information, at FindLaw.com.

Technologist Laura Strachan

(U.S.S.C., Commercial Law, Intellectual Property, Patent) In a patent application seeking protection for a claimed invention explaining how commodities buyers and sellers in the energy market could protect, or hedge, against the risk of price changes, the denial of the application is affirmed where: 1) the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. section 101; 2) Section 101 precluded a reading of the term “process” that would categorically exclude business methods; and 3) even though petitioners’ application was not categorically outside of section 101 under the two atextual approaches the Court rejected today, that did not mean it was a “process” under section 101.

FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP

(U.S. Fed. Cir., Insurance Law, Intellectual Property, Patent) In a suit for patent infringement, related to computerized methods for administering variable annuity plans, district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment as a matter of law that it does not infringe the claims at issue of the ’201 patent is reversed and remanded where: 1) the district court erred in denying defendants’ motion for JMOL of noninfringement as the evidence on the record does not support jury’s verdict of infringement; and 2) because defendant did not infringe, its argument that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to grant it leave to amend its complaint to assert a claim for invalidity under 35 U.S.C. section 101 need not be addressed.

FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP

(U.S. D.C. Cir., Administrative Law, Copyright, Entertainment Law, Intellectual Property, Media Law) In the Recording Industry Association of America’s petition for review of the Copyright Royalty Board’s decision instituting a 1.5 percent per month late fee for late royalty payments, and implementing a penny-rate royalty structure for cell phone ringtones (under which copyright owners received 24 cents for every ringtone sold using their copyrighted work), the petition is denied where: 1) the Board appropriately took market evidence into account when imposing a late fee; 2) a copyright owner’s ability to terminate a section 115 license in no way barred the imposition of a late fee; and 3) even if it were true that divided interests in a copyright made it difficult to make timely payments to each copyright owner, that fact would in no way counsel against the imposition of a late fee.

FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP

(U.S. 10th Cir., Constitutional Law, Copyright, Intellectual Property, International Law) In an action challenging the constitutionality of Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), which granted copyright protection to various foreign works that were previously in the public domain in the U.S., summary judgment for plaintiffs is reversed where: 1) the government’s interest in securing protections abroad for American copyright holders satisfied this substantial government interest standard; 2) Congress had substantial evidence from which it could reasonably conclude that the ongoing harms to American authors were real and not merely conjectural; and 3) there was substantial evidence from which Congress could conclude that Section 514 would alleviate these harms to American copyright holders.

FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP

(U.S. Fed. Cir., Intellectual Property, Patent) In a patent infringement suit by Encyclopedia Britannica against various defendants, involving patents relating to a multimedia database search system for retrieving textual and graphical information, district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in declaring the patents invalid as anticipated by foreign patent application is affirmed as section 120 requires each application in the chain of priority to refer to the prior applications, and here, the patents in suit cannot claim priority as the ’955 application failed to specifically reference the earlier filed ’917 application and did not claim priority to the ’917 application.

FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP

(U.S. Fed. Cir., Corporation & Enterprise Law, Evidence, Intellectual Property, Patent) In a patent infringement suit against defendant and its two employees, related to patents involving technology for automated duplication of compact discs, district court’s judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded where: 1) district court’s denial of defendants’ Rule 59(a) motion is reversed and remanded as the jury’s verdict of the two employees’ individual liability of direct infringement, despite the lack of instructions on defendant’s existence or piercing its corporate veil, was plain error that requires a new trial; 2)jury verdict of individual liability for inducement is reversed as it involved a mistake of law; 3) district court’s legal error in presenting the contributory infringement issue with respect to individual liability of the two employees to the jury requires a new trial; 4) because the verdict was clearly not supported by the evidence and was based on only speculation or guesswork, district court’s denial of defendants’ Rule 59(a) motion is reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages; and 5) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendants’ motion for leave to amend.

FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP FindLaw Opinion Summaries - IP